The response-signal, speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) procedure was used to measure the time-course for constructing literal and figurative interpretations of simple propositions. No differences were found in comprehension speed for literal and figurative strings in a task that required judging whether a string of words was meaningful. Likewise, no differences were found in processing speed for nonsense and figurative strings in a task that required judging whether a string of words was literally true. Figurative strings were less likely to be judged meaningful than literal strings, and less likely to be rejected as literally true than nonsense strings. The absence of time-course differences is inconsistent with approaches to figurative processing that contend that a figurative interpretation is computed after an anomalous literal interpretation. The time-course profiles suggest that literal and figurative interpretations are computed in equal time, but that the meaning of the latter is less constrained than the former.
The construction of a figurative interpretation for a string like Some surgeons are butchers (Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983) has been traditionally viewed as subordinate to the construction of a literal interpretation. What Cacciari and Glucksberg (1994) refer to as the standard view of figurative processing -a view which largely stems from Searle (1979) and Grice (1975) -argues that a figurative interpretation is signalled by the failure to construct a plausible literal interpretation. According to this serial approach to figurative comprehension, listeners/readers first attempt to construct a literal interpretation for a figurative string, seeking a figurative interpretation only after a literal reading is found to be implausible. Cacciari and Glucksberg (1994; see also Gibbs, 1994 ) outline several problems with the traditional view. First, specifying the grounds on which readers reject a literal interpretation in favor of a figurative interpretation has proved difficult. Clear counter-examples can be found to proposals that readers detect syntactic and semantic anomalies (e.g., Matthews, 1971) , detect literal falsehood (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979) , or seek to determine the truth value of an interpretation with respect to a mental model (e.g., Miller, 1979) . Often, as Black (1979) notes, a nonliteral reading can be signalled simply by the banality of the literal reading. Second, readers may not fully derive a literal interpretation in all circumstances. For familiar idioms and indirect requests, readers appear to truncate a literal interpretation when the figurative (or indirect) interpretation is salient (Cacciari & Tabossi, 1988; Gibbs, 1980) . Finally, when both literal and figurative readings are contextually appropriate, Keysar (1989) has argued that readers compute both interpretations. On the traditional view, processing should be restricted to a literal interpretation since it provides a sufficient interpretation of the string.
More direct tests of the traditional view are provided by on-line measures of the time needed to compute literal and figurative interpretations. A figurative interpretation should be associated with longer processing times if its construction depends on first deriving an anomalous literal interpretation. Unfortunately, extant results are somewhat mixed. Several studies have found comparable reading times for figurative and literal strings when the prior context sufficiently cues the appropriate interpretation, but reliably longer reading times for figurative strings when contextual support is minimal (Inhoff, Lima, & Carroll, 1984; Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds, & Antos, 1978; Shinjo & Myers, 1987) . However, Gerrig and Healy (1983) found slower processing times for figurative strings even when an informative context preceded a required metaphoric reading (for a review see Cacciari & Glucksberg, 1994) .
Reading times (eye-movement tracking or various self-paced reading measures) provide a relatively natural and unintrusive measure of processing time. However, reading time differences can result from a confluence of factors, only a subset of which may reflect true underlying differences in processing speed (McElree, 1993; McElree & Griffith, 1995; 1998) . The fact that language comprehension is presumably mediated by a set of largely automatic, highly overlearned mental procedures does not entail that language performance is error free. A reading time difference can reflect differences in the probability that certain forms of information are retrieved and successfully processed rather than an intrinsic difference in the time it takes to retrieve and process that information. For example, McElree (1993) argued that reading time differences for a verb in a frequent versus an infrequent syntactic environment reflect the probability that each syntactic form is retrieved from the verb's lexical representation and not from a serial architecture in which parsing operations first attempt to compute the most frequent structure associated with the verb (Holmes, 1987; Shapiro, Brookins, Gordon, & Nagel, 1991; Ford, 1986) .
Reading time differences between figurative and literal interpretations (when observed) may reflect the fact that there is a lower probability that readers successfully converge on the figurative interpretation rather than indicating that computing a figurative interpretation takes more time than computing a related literal interpretation. Both figurative and literal interpretations crucially depend on retrieving and integrating relevant linguistic and pragmatic information; however, they may differ in the probability or ease with which a reader can recover and process information that is crucial to reconstructing the intended meaning. For this reason alone, no difference in reading times between figurative and literal forms can provide unambiguous evidence for a difference in underlying timecourse of processing.
Time-course Measures
The experiments reported here used the response-signal, speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) procedure (Reed, 1973) to derive separate measures of the probability that readers converged on either a literal or figurative interpretation and the time-course for computing each type of interpretation. In our application of the task (see also McElree, 1993; McElree & Griffith, 1995 , 1998 , participants were required to judge whether figurative (example a), literal (example b), or nonsense (example c) strings were either meaningful (Experiment 1a) or literally true (Experiment 1b): a) Some mouths are sewers. b) Some tunnels are sewers. c) Some lamps are sewers.
The strings were presented one word at a time, at a rate that approximated fast reading (250 ms/ word). The final word in each string (e.g., sewers in a-c) forced either a literal, figurative, or nonsensical interpretation. We measured how each interpretation unfolds over time by requiring participants to respond at varying times after the onset of the crucial, final word. Participants were trained to respond within a 100-300 ms window after the presentation of a response signal (a tone). The response signal occurred (randomly across trials) at one of 6 times, ranging from 28-2500 ms after the onset of a final word.
The range of times across which the response signal was presented served to sample the full timecourse of processing, from times when performance was at or near chance to times when performance had reached an asymptotic level. The asymptote of the time-course function provides a measure of the probability (across trials and materials) that the reader succeeded in arriving at an interpretation sufficient to support the judgment. The point at which the time-course function departs from chance, the intercept, and the rate at which the function grows to asymptote provide joint measures of processing speed. The SAT intercept measures the minimum time needed to compute an interpretation sufficient to support either a literal or meaningful response. The SAT rate reflects either the rate of continuous information accrual or the distribution of finishing times if processing is discrete.
A strong test of the traditional view of figurative processing was provided by Experiment 1a, in which participants judged whether the strings were meaningful. This task directly contrasted the speed and accuracy of processing figurative and literal strings. A prediction of the serial model is that figurative strings should be associated with a delayed intercept and/or slower rate than literal strings [see McElree (1993) for a detailed treatment of serial predictions for this type of task; see also McElree & Dosher (1989 , 1993 and McElree & Carrasco (in press) for predictions of serial models in other domains]. This follows from the assumption that a figurative interpretation is not attempted until an anomalous literal interpretation has been computed. A delay in the availability of the figurative interpretation will engender a corresponding delay in when a figurative string is judged "meaningful", providing there is no alternative literal interpretation. How this delay is expressed in SAT dynamics depends on the mean and variance of the difference in the time to compute a literal and figurative interpretation. If the variability in processing time (across trials and materials) is small relative to the mean difference, then most of the temporal differences will be evident in the SAT intercepts. Modest differences in variability can, however, attenuate intercept differences and engender corresponding differences in SAT rate. 2 Mixtures of intercept and rate effects are more likely since variance typically 2. Intuitively, consider two finishing time distributions, with one shifted in time relative to the other. The corresponding SAT functions represent the cumulative form of the distributions. If mean processing time is longer in one condition than in other, but the variance in processing time is approximately equal, then the leading edges of the respective distributions will be separated by the difference in mean processing time. The SAT intercept reflects the leading edge of the distribution; so a difference in SAT intercepts indicates that the leading edges of the distributions are separated by the corresponding amount of time. If the variance of the slower process is larger than the variance of the faster process, then the difference in the leading edges will decrease. In this case, temporal differences will be partly expressed in SAT rate. It is typically assumed that variance increases when additional serial processes are added, so most viable serial models predict some combination of rate and intercept effects. increases with the mean. Crucially, these dynamics or speed differences are predicted independently of potential differences in asymptotic accuracy. That is, the intercepts and rates of the SAT function measure the speed of processing for just the proportion of cases in which the reader has successfully computed a plausible interpretation.
Judgments of the meaningfulness of a string contrast figurative and literal strings, using nonsense strings (to which participants should respond "no") as a baseline estimate of the false alarm rate for the judgment. In a second task, we followed on the work of Glucksberg and colleagues (Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg, Gildea, & Bookin, 1982) in using a literal judgment task ("Is the string literally true?") to contrast the time-course of figurative and nonsense strings. Glucksberg and colleagues used a reaction time task to document that metaphors such as example (a) induced a stroop-like effect, being rejected more slowly than nonsense strings such as example (c). The inflated rejection times for figurative strings suggest that some, but not all (Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983) , metaphors are processed automatically.
The automaticity of metaphoric processing is orthogonal to the issue of whether figurative strings are processed by a serial process that first seeks to compute a literal interpretation. However, if the serial model is correct and figurative processing is indeed automatic, then figurative strings should be associated with a slower (rejection) time-course than nonsense strings since the metaphoric interpretation will interfere with a "no" response when it becomes available. The interference effect will engender a time-course function for figurative strings with either a delayed intercept or a slower rate of rise, depending on the point in time when the metaphoric interpretation is available.
Method
Participants. Thirteen native English speakers from the New York University community participated in 3 approximately 1-hour sessions (2 experimental sessions and 1 practice session). All participants were paid for serving in the experiment.
Apparatus, Stimuli & Procedure. Stimulus presentation, timing, and response collection were all carried out on a personal computer using software with millisecond timing, synchronized to the vertical re-trace interrupt. A trial began with a fixation point (a small filled square) presented for 500 ms in the center of an otherwise clear screen. The words of a string were presented one after another in the center of the screen in a normal mixture of upper and lower case characters. Each word remained on the screen for 250 ms. A period was appended to the final word of the string to clearly indicate to participants that the presentation of the string was complete. At one of six response lags, either 28, 200, 400, 600, 800, or 2500 ms after the onset of the final word in the string, a 50-ms, 1000 Hz tone was presented. Participants were instructed and trained to respond "yes" or "no" at the tone by pressing one of two designated keys on the keyboard. After a response was recorded, visual feedback on the latency to respond to the tone was displayed to the participant. The participants were informed that responses longer than 300 ms were unacceptably long and that responses shorter than 100 ms should be regarded as anticipations. All participants had an initial one-hour practice session that served as training in the SAT procedure. Both the sentences and the response lags were randomized within a session.
In Experiment 1a, participants were instructed to read the strings as they would normally read any text and, when the tone sounded, to judge whether the string was a "meaningful statement". In Experiment 1b, participants were asked to judge whether the "string was literally true" when the tone sounded. Seven participants performed the meaningful judgments task first, while the remaining participants performed the literal task first.
Materials. All strings were of the form Some Xs are Ys. The primary contrasts consisted of 240 triples that shared a common final noun (e.g., stone). Literal, figurative, and nonsense strings were created by selecting different subject nouns (e.g., "Some temples are stone", "Some hearts are stone", and "Some clouds are stone", respectively). The set of materials was carefully reviewed by four individuals to verify the status of each member of the triple. 3 The Appendix I lists the 240 triples.
All 240 triples were presented in both the meaningful and literal judgment tasks. One-hundred and five additional nonsense strings (e.g., Some artists are staplers; Some grocers are batteries; Some turnips are curtains) were included in the meaningful judgment task to increase the proportion of "no" responses to 41.7%. Fifty additional literal strings were added to the literal judgment task (e.g., Some mechanisms are staplers; Some implements are batteries; Some fabrics are curtains) to increase the proportion of "yes" responses to 37.8%.
Data Analysis. A measure was used for each task in order to derive time-course functions that were not influenced by response biases. In the meaningful task, the z-scores for the hit rate for literal and figurative strings were scaled against z-scores for the false alarm rate for nonsense strings at each response lag for each participant. In the literal task, the z-scores for the hit rate for literal strings were scaled against z-scores for the false alarm rate for figurative and nonsense strings at each response lag for each participant. Perfect performance at any lag was adjusted by a minimum-error correction (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991) to ensure that, given the sample size, the values were measurable.
To estimate asymptotic accuracy and processing dynamics (speed), the empirical SAT functions were fit with an exponential approach to a limit:
, for t > , else 0.
(EQ 1) Equation 1 describes the growth of accuracy over processing time using three parameters: i) , an asymptotic parameter reflecting the overall accuracy with maximal processing time; ii) , an intercept parameter reflecting the discrete point in time when accuracy departs from chance ( = 0); and iii) , a rate of rise parameter that describes the rate at which accuracy grows from chance to asymptote. Differences in processing speed or dynamics are reflected in either the intercepts ( ) and/or rates of rise to asymptote ( ) parameters. Numerous studies have found that Equation 1 provides a precise quantitative summary of the shape of a full time-course SAT function (Dosher, 1976 (Dosher, , 1979 (Dosher, , 1981 (Dosher, , 1982 (Dosher, , 1984 McElree, 1993 McElree, , 1996 McElree & Dosher, 1989 , 1993 McElree & Griffith, 1995; Reed, 1973 Reed, , 1976 Wickelgren, 1977 ; see also Ratcliff, 1978 for an alternative three-parameter equation derived from the random-walk (diffusion) model and McElree & Dosher, 1989 for a comparison of the two equations).
3. No attempt was made to equate the degree of "meaningfulness" of the literal and figurative strings, by, for example, selecting strings on the basis of normative ratings. Such a selection procedure would be crucial for measures like reaction time where both the degree of meaningfulness and the time-course of processing are confounded. However, the asymptote of SAT function for Experiment 1a provides a more relevant measure of the differences in meaningfulness. The major advantage of this measure is that it uses the same binomial scale that is used to measure time-course.
All analyses were performed on the individual participants' data. Consistent patterns across participants are summarized with analyses and graphs of the average (over participants) data. Differences among the SAT functions were quantified by fitting the exponential in Equation 1 with an iterative hill climbing algorithm (Reed, 1976) , similar to STEPIT (Chandler, 1969) . This fitting procedure minimized the squared deviations of predicted values from observed data. A hierarchical model testing scheme was used to determine the best fitting exponential model. The functions were fit with sets of nested models that systematically varied the three parameters of Equation 1. These models ranged from a null model in which all functions were fit with a single asymptote ( ), rate ( ), and intercept ( ) to a fully saturated model in which each function was fit with a unique asymptote, rate, and intercept. The quality of the fit was assessed by using three criteria, as follows: i) The value of an R 2 statistic, (EQ 2) where represents the observed data values, indicates the predicted values, is the mean, n is the number of data points, and k is the number of free parameters (Reed, 1973) . This R 2 statistic is the proportion of variance accounted for by the fit, adjusted by the number of (k) free parameters (Judd & McClelland, 1989) . ii) Evaluation of the consistency of the parameter estimates across the participants. iii) Evaluation of whether the fit yielded systematic (residual) deviations that could be accommodated by allocating more (i.e., separate) parameters to various conditions. One limitation of the SAT procedure is important to acknowledge. This procedure is designed to derive time-course functions for individual participants. It is crucial to measure time-course on an individual basis since the variance in asymptote, rate, and intercept of the time-course functions between participants often exceeds the variance between conditions. However, a typical SAT study does not have a sufficient number of cross-item replications for an item-based analysis. To partially compensate for this deficiency, the assignment of strings to a response lag was randomized in our design. This ensures that any systematic difference across participants in one or another component of the SAT function (e.g., asymptote) was not due to a few extreme items.
Results

Experiment 1a.
The top panel of Figure 1 presents the average (over participants) time-course functions (in units) for judgments of the literal and figurative strings when the task required an assessment of meaningfulness. Performance at the longest response signal (2.5 s) provides an empirical measure of asymptotic performance. Asymptotic levels of performance were higher for literal than figurative strings by, on average, 0.5 units, F(1,12) = 13.2, MSe = 0.1295, p = 0.003. This difference indicates that our figurative strings were less meaningful than the comparable literal strings. This may be the case if, in general, the meaning of a metaphor is less constrained than the meaning of a literal string, or, in the more limiting case, the metaphors used here were less semantically constrained than the literal strings.
Crucially, however, fits of the full time-course functions with Equation 1 enable one to determine
whether a figurative interpretation was available later than a literal interpretation on the proportion of trials on which each interpretation was computed. Adequate fits of time-course data required a separate asymptotic parameter ( in Equation 1) for figurative and literal strings, consistent with the analysis above. In the average data and across individual participants, all fits of the two functions with a single asymptotic parameter produced systematic residuals at the late processing times and, consequently, yielded relatively low adjusted-R 2 values (.888 to .916 in the average data). In contrast, a 2 -1 -1 fit produced a substantially higher adjusted-R 2 value (.948 in the average data). Moreover, the estimated parameters for all 13 participants showed a consistent advantage for literal strings, F(1,12) = 34.7, MSe = 0.1337, p < 0.001. . Table 1 . Beyond these asymptotic differences, however, there was no evidence to suggest that time-course, estimated by the intercept ( ) or the rate ( ) parameters, differed for figurative and literal strings. First, allocating additional or parameters (viz., 2 -2 -1 , 2 -1 -2 , or 2 -2 -2 models) reduced the overall adjusted-R 2 from those observed with the 2 -1 -1 model, indicating that the additional dynamics parameters were not accounting for systematic variance across conditions. Second, when the rate and intercept parameters were allowed to vary, no systematic differences in the parameter estimates emerged across participants. For example, with a 2 -2 -2 model, 6 participants showed a rate ( ) advantage for figurative strings while 7 participants showed a rate advantage for literal strings. The average 1/ estimates across participants were ( ) ms for figurative strings and ms for literal strings, t(12) = 0.84, p = .42. With respect to the intercept parameter, 7 participants showed an advantage for figurative strings and 6 participants showed an advantage for literal strings. The average intercepts across participants were ms for figurative strings and ms for literal strings, t(12) = -0.31, p = .75. The similar and estimates for figurative and literal strings and, crucially, the random manner in which the differences are ordered across participants (approximately half favoring figurative strings and half favoring literal strings), indicate that there were no systematic differences in processing speed for the two types of strings. (Appendix II lists the and estimates from the 2 -2 -2 model for each participant.) Parameter estimates for the best fitting 2 -1 -1 model are shown in Table 1 .
The absence of systematic time-course differences between figurative and literal strings is inconsistent with a serial model that argues that a figurative interpretation is computed after an anomalous literal interpretation. The time-course data indicate that, contra the traditional view, figurative and literal interpretations are computed in comparable time. Figure 1 presents the average (over participants) time-course functions (in units) for judgments of the nonsense and figurative strings when the task required an assessment of whether the strings were literally true. Again, performance at the longest response signal (2.5 s) provides an empirical measure of asymptotic performance. Asymptotic rejection rates were higher for nonsense than for figurative strings by, on average, 0.51 units, F(1,12) = 12.4, MSe = 0.1362, p = 0.004. This difference is consistent with the notion that on a proportion of trials the metaphors were misinterpreted as literally true statements.
Experiment 1b. The bottom panel of
Fits of the full time-course functions displayed a pattern similar to judgments of meaningfulness. A 2 -1 -1 model was required to fit the asymptotic differences in performance in the average data and the data from 8 of the 13 participants, as fits with a single asymptotic parameter produced lower adjusted-R 2 values and left systematic residuals. For the remaining 5 participants, however, the adjusted-R 2 values for a 2 -1 -1 model were either similar or slightly lower than those for the 1 -1 -1 model. Nevertheless, when each participant was fit with the 2 -1 -1 , the estimated parameters showed an advantage for nonsense over figurative strings, F(1,12) = 34.2, MSe = 0.0349, p < 0.001. Beyond these differences in asymptote, there was no evidence that judgments of nonsense and figurative strings differed in time-course. As before, more embellished models reduced adjusted-R 2 values and there were no systematic differences across participants in either the resulting rate ( ) or intercept ( ) estimates when the two strings were allotted separate parameters. In fits of a 2 -2 -2 model, for example, 6 participants showed slower rate estimates for figurative as compared to nonsense strings, while the remaining 7 participants showed the opposite pattern. The average rate estimates (1/ ) across participants were ms for figurative strings and ms for nonsense strings, t(12) = 0.09, p = .92. The differences in intercept were more systematic, although The lower asymptotic rejection rates for figurative strings suggest that readers fail to differentiate metaphors from literal strings on a proportion of trials. However, the similar time-course profiles for figurative and nonsense strings are inconsistent with the notion of a late accruing figurative interpretation that interferes with the rejection of the figurative strings as non-literal. If such were the case, the dynamics portion of the SAT function for figurative strings should have been delayed (e.g., delayed intercept or slower rate) relative to the function for nonsense strings which lack this potential source of interference.
Examination of the intercept estimates in Table 1 suggests that the intercepts are longer for the meaningful task ( ms) than for the literal task ( ), and this difference was significant, t(12) = 2.64, p= 0.021. The smaller difference in rate, and (respectively) in 1/ ms units, was not significant. However, if one combines rate and intercept into a composite measure to avoid parameter tradeoffs (e.g., an earlier intercept, but slower rate), the time-course difference between tasks is not significant, (t(12)=1.48, p=0.16). Consequently, this apparent dynamics advantage for the literal task should be viewed with caution, and should be replicated before any general conclusions concerning the two tasks are drawn. Nevertheless, we note that it is not surprising to find that different tasks engender different time-course profiles, as they likely require participants to adopt different decision processes and criteria.
Prima facie, it may be surprising to find faster processing dynamics for literal as compared to meaningful judgments. However, it is possible that literal judgments can be reliably based on a subset of the information that is required for an accurate assessment of meaningfulness. Here, such judgments may have been in part determined by an assessment of the degree of relatedness or similarity of the subject and predicate phrases (e.g., metal-iron, in Some metals are iron; birds-parrots, in Some birds are parrots). Similarity information would have limited value in the meaningful task, as it would not reliably differentiate figurative and nonsense strings. Crucially, Ratcliff and McKoon (1982) found that a general assessment of the similarity of constituents in simple proposition like A robin is a bird is available before detailed relational information. If participants used similarity information as a heuristic for literal truth early in processing, then initial values would be higher in the literal as compared to the meaningful judgment task.
Discussion
Time-course of Figurative Interpretation. We found no evidence to indicate that figurative strings like Some mouths are sewers take longer to understand than literal strings like Some tunnels are sewers, despite the fact that figurative strings are less likely to be judged meaningful. The comparable temporal dynamics for interpreting figurative and literal strings are incompatible with any viable formulation of a serial processing model in which figurative processing is delayed until the string has been interpreted in a literal fashion. To the contrary, the data suggest that both types of interpretations are computed in equal time. The literal judgment task provided convergent support for the claim that figurative processing is not contingent on first computing a literal representation. Glucksberg and colleagues (Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg, et al., 1982) have argued that figurative processing is automatic, based on the finding of stroop-like interference effects in a literal judgment task. If a figurative interpretation accrues later than a literal interpretation, the dynamics of the time-course function for figurative strings should have been slowed relative to the function for nonsense strings as a consequence of the late accruing interference from the metaphor interpretation. 4 Although figurative strings were less likely to be rejected than nonsense strings, we found that, to the contrary, the temporal dynamics for rejecting figurative strings were indistinguishable from the dynamics for nonsense strings.
Some caution is always in order when arguing from a null result. Of particular concern is whether the task has the requisite sensitivity to detect potential time-course differences. In this regard, it is important to note that dynamics differences of less than 50 ms in both intercept ( ) and rate ( ) have been documented in other SAT tasks with nearly identical experimental procedures. McElree and Griffith (1995; see also McElree & Griffith, 1998) , for example, contrasted unacceptable strings like Some students amuse exams, in which there is a thematic (semantic) mismatch between the verb and direct object, and unacceptable strings like Some students laugh exams, in which the direct object violated the (intransitive) syntactic requirements of the verb. Thematic violations were associated with slower dynamics, which were well fit by a serial (or cascade) model in which syntactic relations are computed before semantic relations. Similarly, McElree (1993) documented time-course differences arising from syntactic "garden-paths". After reading strings like While John rushed Mary…, judgments of a fragment like started work were associated with a slower time-course than judgments of fragments like around work. Here, the time-course difference tracked the time taken to reanalyze the second noun (Mary) as the subject of a main clause following an initial preference to analyze it as a direct object of the subordinate clause. The clear time-course differences documented in these studies demonstrate that the SAT procedure is well suited to detecting temporal differences arising from various types of reanalysis processes. The lack of time-course differences in the current study suggests that there is little empirical content to the claim that figurative processing is contingent on an initial assessment of literal plausibility.
Towards a Model of Figurative Interpretation
The time-course data indicate that literal and figurative interpretations are computed in equal time or in parallel. Time-course profiles do not, of course, uniquely specify the types of mental processes that underlie the construction of a figurative or literal interpretation. However, similar time-course profiles are consistent with the contention that both types of interpretation are computed by similar, if not identical, processes. Cacciari and Glucksberg (1995; see also Glucksberg & Keysar, 1993) suggest that metaphoric statements of the sort examined here can be regarded as class inclusion statements, in which properties of the predicate (the metaphoric vehicle) are attributed to the subject (metaphoric topic). McElree & Griffith (1995) , and Ratcliff & McKoon (1982 .
Some tunnels are sewers in that sewer as a metaphoric vehicle refers to the class of things that it typifies (e.g., dirty and fouls things) while sewer as a literal predicate refers to tokens of the type (in this case, token of the class of subterranean conduits). The interpretative process in both cases can be viewed as an attributive process in which properties retrieved from the predicate are ascribed to the subject phrase.
In such an account, time-course should not differ for interpreting the two types of strings unless retrieving the relevant properties associated with the predicate requires fundamentally different types of operations. Current time-course evidence suggests, however, that different types of semantic relations are retrieved with comparable temporal dynamics. Corbett and Wickelgren (1978) found that retrieval dynamics (SAT intercept and rate) were equivalent for category instances with high and low dominance (A robin is a bird versus A chicken is a bird) , although the latter were associated with lower asymptotic levels (see also Casey & Heath, 1990) . More relevant to the present issue, Ratcliff and McKoon (1982) found similar time-course profiles for the verification of synonym relations (A carpet is a rug), category membership (A color is purple), and descriptions (A razor is sharp). While none of these relations directly map on to what a class inclusion approach contends is the fundamental difference between literal and figurative strings, current data indicate that many different types of semantic properties are retrieved with similar dynamics.
While we found no evidence for temporal differences in computing literal and figurative interpretations, asymptotic accuracy was lower for figurative strings. This suggests that the meaning of our figurative strings was less constrained than comparable literal strings. We cannot determine whether this is generally true of metaphoric statements or is just true of our particular sample. Nevertheless, we note that, within a class inclusion framework (Cacciari & Glucksberg, 1995) , this effect follows from an assumption that readers fail on a proportion of trials either to recover the necessary semantic properties from the metaphoric vehicle (e.g., the class of things that sewers typify) or to properly ascribe those properties to the metaphoric topic (e.g., mouths). We suspect that reading time differences between figurative and literal strings, when observed (e.g., Gerrig & Healy, 1983; Inhoff, Lima, & Carroll, 1984; Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds, & Antos, 1978; Shinjo & Myers, 1987) , also reflect the difficulty of recovering key semantic properties associated with the metaphoric vehicle and ascribe those properties to the topic (for the latter, see Glucksberg et al., 1997 ). An enriched context may attenuate these differences by providing a set of retrieval cues that increases the probability of recovering the key semantic properties that serve as the foundation for the figurative expression. 
